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ii

COME NOW the Defendants/Respondents, Multi-State Electric, LLC, Employer, and
State Insurance Fund, Surety, (hereinafter referred to as "Defendants"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., and submit this
Defendants/Respondents' Brief.

Defendants assert that the decision of the Industrial

Commission was correct factually, substantively and procedurally and its Order dismissing the
Complaint should be affirmed.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant/Claimant's (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant") "Statement of the Case" is
apparently contained in the "Case History" in his brief. That "Case History" fails to comply with
Appellate Rule 35(a) and does not contain a statement of the case, a description of the course of
proceedings or an accurate statement of the facts supported by citations to the record. Such
failure to support by use of citations is grounds for dismissal of an appeal.

A. Nature of the Case.
Claimant contended that he was injured in one or more industrial accidents. Defendants
asserted that Claimant had not borne his burden of proving that an industrial accident or
accidents occurred or that he suffered an injury in an industrial accident and argued that, in any
event, Claimant had not provided proper notice under Idaho Code §72-701. The Industrial
Commission concluded that Claimant failed to prove that he had suffered an injury from a
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workplace accident and had failed to prove that he satisfied the notice requirement of the
Worker's Compensation statute. It dismissed Claimant's Complaint and Claimant moved for
reconsideration. The Industrial Commission denied that motion and the Claimant appealed.
Defendants do not deny that Claimant had a bad back for many years prior to his
employment with the Employer. They do not deny that Claimant informed his Employer at
various times that his back was hurting. Rather, they deny that any "accident" occurred. They
assert that Claimant did not tell the Employer or the Surety or the medical providers that his back
pain was the result of an industrial accident until long after the alleged incidents. Instead, he
"remembered" the incidents long after the alleged dates that they occurred and only after he
realized that he would need to identify an "accident" in order to receive worker's compensation
benefits to treat his chronic back problems. Defendants also assert that Claimant did not have an
industrial "accident" as defined in the Worker's Compensation statute which caused the chronic
condition for which he is seeking treatment.

B. Course of Proceedings.
On or about March 18, 2013, Claimant filed his Complaint with the Industrial
Commission. (Agency's Record (hereinafter "R") p. 1). Defendants answered, denying that any
accident occurred and denying that proper notice was provided. (R p.12). Discovery proceeded
and the hearing occurred on January 31, 2014. Post-hearing briefing was conducted and on May
20, 2014 the Industrial Commission issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order. (R p. 14). The Commissioners chose not to adopt the Referee's recommendation. The
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Industrial Commission decision found that Claimant had not borne his burden of proving that he
suffered a compensable injury in a workplace accident and also found that he had not provided
proper notice. (Id. p. 29). Claimant filed a "Notice of Appeal/Brief and Statement of the Facts"
on June 9, 2014 which was not a proper notice under the Idaho Appellate Rules but was accepted
as a "Request for Reconsideration" by the Industrial Commission. Defendants responded (R p.
39) and the Industrial Commission issued an Order denying reconsideration on July 17, 2014.
(Id. p. 48). Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 28, 2014. (Id. p. 51).

C. Statement of Facts.
Claimant is a 47 year old electrician who had worked as an electrician for almost thirty
years. (Chadwick Deposition, R, Defs Exh pp. 58-59). He underwent two years of training
sponsored by an electrical union in 1990 - 1991 even though he had begun working as an
electrician in 1985. (Id. pp. 60-61). His work has been heavy labor, including use of concrete
saws, jackhammers and tampers, and pulling wire which consists of carrying heavy strands of
cable.
In approximately 1997, Claimant moved to Idaho and worked for various electrical
contractors. (Id. pp. 63-65). In approximately 2006, Claimant went to work at Employer MultiState Electric and worked there until August 6, 2012.

(Id. p. 65).

When there was work

available at Employer, Claimant would work forty hours a week. (Id. p. 68). He seldom, if ever,
worked on Saturday.
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Prior to the alleged incidents at issue in this case, Claimant was involved in at least three
motor vehicle accidents. In one his fractured his hip and was on crutches for three months. (R.
Defs Exh p. 66). In another one he apparently hit his head on the windshield and "maybe went
to a chiropractor." In the third one, on December 7, 2009, he apparently suffered some injury to
his neck. (Id. and Defs Exh p. 1). Claimant sought chiropractic treatment for the 2009 injury
from Dr. Kevin Rosenlund of Kuna Chiropractic Clinic and treated for cervical and thoracic
problems. (Id. p. 7).
On May 29, 2012, a Tuesday, Claimant presented to Dr. Rosenlund with low back pain
which began on May 26, 2012, a Saturday. (Id. p. 9). While the chart note states the condition
arose while the Claimant was "jumping out of the truck," Claimant admitted that he didn't
remember telling the chiropractor that he hurt his back at work: "So that's how it came into
there being, supposedly, two accidents that I had at work. I originally didn't go to [Dr.] Kevin
[Rosenlund] and tell him it was a work-related accident." (Id. p. 71, at Depo p. 58 I. 21 - p. 59 1.
2). Claimant admitted:
A: I don't recall telling him that I hurt myself at work; that it was a
workmen's comp. claim because I paid him directly, thinking I'm a
little sore, I need some adjustments, and that's all. ...
Q: Do you remember [telling the chiropractor that you jumped off a
truck?]
A: I don't remember saying those words to him specifically, no.
Q: Do you remember ever jumping off the truck?
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A: I jump and climb in and out of the truck all the time with my tool
bags on. I climb in and grab a roll of wire. When I say "jump," I don't
mean I'm jumping two feet off a cliff. It is just stepping, jumping out
of the van. It is not like a hop, jump.
Q. All right. So when you told your chiropractor that back in May of
2012, you were talking about, as I understand what you're saying, is
that -- just sort of the normal getting in and out of the truck and
walking with a tool bag? That's when your back started hurting?

A. Yes. That's when I first started seeing the chiropractor.
Q. So you didn't tell him a particular incident? It was just your normal
work? Is that generally correct?

A. He questioned me on why I was there. So it would have been
specified as, yes, it was an incident or not an accident. The reason
why I'm there. And it wasn't -- I don't believe it was documented as
he's corning in for an accident and he's going to have a claim. It was
like, you know, "Hi, Doctor. My back is hurting. Can you help me?"
And him questioning me and manipulating me.
Q. Do you know -- I mean, what you were referring to, my
understanding is you must have talked to him, the chiropractor, back in
May and saying -- he asked, "Why are you here?" You said, "My low
back hurts from jumping in and out of the truck," or whatever; is that
accurate?

A. Yes, it is accurate. I went to see him because my back was hurting
and work had- I started getting busy. It was slow working up to
May of 2012. It was hit-and-miss work. I was hardly working. And
when we picked up the Einstein Oilery job, prior to that job I had done
three jobs in between, I believe, January, February, March, beginning
of the year was slow. And I was finishing a job in downtown Boise
the end of April. Finishing that, starting Einstein, starting a Bull Frog
and an A&R, and these are all small, tenant improvement jobs that I'm
working on by myself. And I do everything. Brad shows up, looks at
stuff and goes on his way. And it was just -- we're both happy we're
working. We've got jobs finally. So things were rolling along, and my
back started hurting me. I went to the chiropractor at the end of
May.
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Q. So you started getting busier and working harder and your back
started gradually hurting, and that's when you went to the
chiropractor?

A. Yes.
Q. Had you had back problems before -- low back problems before
that? Were you having back pains before May of 2012?
A. No. It may have been aches, but it wasn't nothing significant to
even go to a chiropractor. And I had seen the chiropractor past in -prior to my auto accident in 2009. It was not my first time to see a
chiropractor.
Q. After the auto accident in 2009, you said the last time you went to
him was March of 201 0?

A. Yeah, March or May. Something like
that.
Q. Had you gone to a chiropractor between March of 2010 and May of
2012?
A.No.
Q. All right. But were you having low back pains during that time
period?

A. Not that I recall. Just maybe aches and pains, and it would have
been a comment to Brad, you know, "moving slow."
Q. Okay. Because your back hurt or something?

A. Yeah, my back was aching.
Q. And that's kind of what you continued to tell him after May until
August; is that right? That you were moving slow and having back
problems and needed to either go to the chiropractor or whatever; is
that correct?
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A. That is correct. And it wasn't until after I started seeing the
documents of all of the doctor's notes that it came into where the May
incident happened. I still don't include that as what my claim was, it is
just part of leading up to the injury of July.

(Id. at 71, Depo p.59, 1.4 - p. 63, 1. 13).

Brad Baker, the owner of the Employer, testified at the Hearing that Claimant never told
him of any May work incident and he never knew of any such claimed accident until months
later when the Claimant was filing a formal claim for the alleged July accident.
Transcript (Tr) p. 92 11. 9-20).

(Hearing

Claimant acknowledged he never told the Employer of any

alleged work comp accident in May although he might have mentioned that his back was hurting
and he was "moving slow." (R p. 72, Depo. p. 62 1.22 - p. 63, 1.13).
Claimant admitted in his deposition that it was not until he had copies of his pnor
medical records after providing a release to the State Insurance Fund in September or October of
2012 that he even recalled the May accident. "And it wasn't until after I started seeing the
documents of all the doctor's notes that it came into where the May incident happened. I still
don't include that as what my claim was, it is just part of leading up to the injury of July." (Id. at
72. Depo. p. 63, 11. 8-13) (emphasis added).
Claimant also acknowledged to a State Insurance Fund Investigator in a recorded
statement that he never told the Employer of any "accident" in May and indeed did not believe
there was any accident in May. (R, Defs Exh 9, Recorded Statement of Claimant at 45:00 -
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45:55). This is reinforced by the fact that Claimant paid for all chiropractic treatment by himself
and never requested the Employer to pay for any such treatment. Claimant's wife testified that
she recalled no complaints of an injury until the July-August date, although before then he had
back complaints. (Tr p. 79, 11 15-22).

Indeed, even as late as July 30, 2013, a year later,

Claimant told Dr. Richard Manos, Spine Institute of Idaho, that while he began having back pain
in May of 2012: "He denies any specific injury but states that he does wear a tool belt and he

was doing a significant amount of bending and twisting at that time." (R, Defs Exh p. 42).
Claimant's "Affidavit in Support of Prima Facia" filed with the Commission m
September of 2013 says that in May his back starting aching more from the "physically
demanding job I have." (R, Defs Exh p. 53). There is no indication that there was any type of
accident.
Claimant also contends that he injured or reinjured his low back in an incident on July 26,
2012, involving either the picking up or the usage of a "trencher" rented at Tates Rents. On
July 30, 2012, four days after the alleged trencher accident, Claimant visited Kuna Chiropractic
Clinic. (R, Defs Exh p. 9). Nowhere in that chart note is there any mention of any trencher
accident. On August 6, 2012 the Claimant again visited Kuna Chiropractic Clinic and was
advised to seek an evaluation with a physician. (R, Claimant's Exh E, pp. 175-77). There is still
no mention of any trencher incident.
On August 6, 2012, Claimant presented to Ann Weiss, M.D., at Primary Health Medical
Group. The "Reason for Appointment" was back pain which started "last Thur." (R, Defs Exh
p. 13). (The Court will note that August 6, the date of the appointment, was Monday, and "last
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Thursday" from that date would have been August 2, not July 26.)

The "Reason for the

Appointment" goes on to state that the Claimant "has been seeing a chiro for low back since
June. Pain got worse today." The "History of Present Illness" notes that the Claimant "has had
chronic back pain for many years . . .. Having severe pain in lower right back today, does not
recall recent injury or strain." He complained of "past symptoms; chronic pain" and "denies
"acute injury." The chart note also specifies that the visit was "Self Pay" and says nothing about
any workers compensation claim.

(Id.).

There was absolutely nothing mentioned about a

trencher accident.
On August 13, 2012, Claimant sought treatment at McKim Chiropractic Clinic. (R, Defs
Exh p. 10). The "Information Chart" notes that Claimant received chiropractic care on and off in
the past. The New Patient History form notes that his symptoms have been "on/off' for a year.
The symptoms began a week ago "gradually." (Id. p. 12). There is no mention of any trencher
incident.
Claimant also went to Advantage Walk-In Chiropractic on August 15, 2012. (R, Defs
Exh p. 44). A New Patient History form indicates that the symptoms began approximately
August 1, 2012, and they began "gradually." (Id. at 46). Nowhere is there any mention of a
trencher incident.
Claimant returned to Primary Health Medical Group on August 17, 2012 and saw
Physician Assistant Colin Soares. (Id. p. 15). He complained of an old injury "cumulative
injury" and denied an acute injury. Claimant now claimed this was a work comp injury because
it was "related to work exacerbated by, onset was at work, repetitive motion, labor." Nowhere
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was there any mention of a trencher incident or any other specific injury. The x-ray report of
that same date indicated that indications were "Right sided low back pain. No known injury."
(Id. p. 18). The preliminary x-ray results were negative for acute injury. (Id. p. 16).

Claimant returned to Primary Health Medical Group on August 23, 2012, and saw Dr.
Stephen Martinez. Dr. Martinez's explanation of why this was a "work comp injury" provided:
"injury occurred at work DOI: 5/29/12 suffered injury to low back while on the job. No falls or
trauma, but feels that repetitive lifting and bending activities while on the job is the cause of his
back pain. He states he was seen recently in urgent care and claimed that it was not a work
related condition, but now he feels that it is indeed a work related condition." (Id. p. 19). This
report was sent to the Employer.
Once the Employer was informed that Claimant was contending his low back pain was a
workers compensation claim, he filled out the "First Report of Injury" on August 27, 2012. (R,
Defs Exh p. 33). He noted that on August 6, 2012 Claimant had reported that his back hurt and
he could not come to work, and specified that the injury date was "weekend of August 4, 2012"
because the Claimant had never told him of any work injury or incident. (Id. at p. 24 ).
Indeed, Claimant himself did not know how or when he allegedly injured himself at
work. This is seen in the transcript of a telephone message left with the State Insurance Fund by
the Claimant on October 11, 2012, more than sixty days after the alleged industrial accident. (R,
Defs Exh p. 25). Claimant states that he has been "scratching my brain, trying to figure out
when I could have hurt myself at work, and I think I have pinpointed the date of the accident and
where and how it happened."
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This post-hoc creation of an accident is reinforced by the email Claimant sent to the State
Insurance Fund on November 6, 2012, more than three months after the alleged industrial
accident. (R, Defs Exh p. 26). In that email, Claimant sets forth his actual recollection of the
situation, which directly conflicts with his testimony a year and a half later at Hearing. In the
email he does not state any industrial accident occurred in late May and admits that he did not
tell the Employer of any industrial accident in early August. Indeed, he admits that he did not
recall any specific accident until he went back over the records months later to try to figure out
when he "must have" injured himself: "So when I went back to your doctors I told them it was
work related but I did not recall an accident." (Id. p. 27). The Claimant states:
From the beginning "meaning" the first day I called into work 8/6/12
telling Brad I couldn't come to work cause my back pain was so bad
and I needed to go to a regular doctor to get pain meds Brad knew I
was having back pains, but did not question why or how because it
wasn't the first time I complained about back pain nor did I tell him it
was an accident that happened at work.

(Id. at 26).

Claimant's testimony now is that on July 26, 2012, "between me picking up this trencher
at Tate's Rents in the morning and taking it over to Eagle Road and doing a trench, I hurt my
back, at some point, loading and unloading or using this trencher."

(R, Defs Exh, p. 68,

Claimant's depo at 47, 11. 17-23). Even if that situation would constitute an "industrial accident,"
there is absolutely nothing in the medical records that backs up his story. Brad Baker, the
Employer, testified under oath at the Hearing that until the date of the Hearing itself he had never
heard from the Claimant that he contended anything about Tates Rents or a "trencher accident."
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(Tr. pp. 93-94). Mr. Baker testified that Claimant never told him that any of his back pain was
related to work and never knew this was a workers compensation allegation until after Primary
Health sent materials. (Id. p. 94). Claimant had his wife testify that she believed that Claimant
"would have said that I injured my back but I don't know why and -- or how?" (Id. p. 83, 11. 1524).
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the Claimant's causation problems is found in the
transcript of the statement the Claimant made to the Investigator for the State Insurance Fund on
September 26, 2012. (R, Folder 2 of Defs Exh 9). At 11:15 on the recording, Claimant is asked
about his injury. When asked if there was a specific date when his back became injured or
whether this was a cumulative injury over time when working for the Employer, the Claimant
states it was cumulative from not just when he worked for Multi-State Electric, but prior
employers as well. He acknowledged he could not specifically say when or how his back pain
got triggered and denied there was any specific accident but simply that his pain developed
gradually at the end of July or beginning of August. (Id. at 10:55). He discussed that the injury
may have occurred when he was dealing with a scissors lift but made no mention at all of a
"trencher." (Id. at 13:35). He talked about pain on July 31, 2012. When Claimant was asked
when he first told the Employer that his back pain was work related, he acknowledged that he
never informed the Employer that the injury was work-related or was a workers compensation
injury and certainly never told him of any particular incident. (Id. at 19:55 - 22:48). Claimant
acknowledged that he has had low back pain off and on for years.

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-12
00524438.000

(Id. at 27:40 - 28:06).

Claimant denied he had any accident in May but rather he had normal aches and pains for which
he went to the chiropractor for "maintenance." (Id. at 45:00 - 45:45).
Claimant's own text messages emphasize the reality that he did not tell the Employer
about an accident. On Claimant's Exhibit D, page 84, he states: "I also mention[ed] I didn't
have accident but work-related" on August 15, 2012. As late as October 17, 2012, Claimant's
text to Employer Brad Baker states: "I didn't have an accident at work, but it's work related so
we will have to talk about what's next." (Id. p. 91). In addition, his own notes recognize that no
report of an accident was ever made: "I called John and asked if he remembers me saying I had
an accident-injury? He said no! That's because I wouldn't have done that." (Id. p. 114).
The handwritten Complaint filed by the Claimant has"?" after 5/29/12 when asked about
the date of injury. (R, p. 1). Indeed, in that Complaint filed by the Claimant on March 18, 2013,
he admits: "I did not use the words I hurt my back, had an accident at work, on the job!" (R, p.
1).

The Industrial Commission reviewed the exhibits and the hearing transcript as well as the
pre-hearing deposition testimony of the Claimant.

Rather than accepting the Referee's

recommendations, the three Commissioners issued their own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order. (R, p. 14). They carefully went through the factual background and the medical
history and carefully analyzed the applicable statutory and case law.

They found that the

Claimant had failed to prove that he suffered an injury from a workplace accident on May 29,
2012 or July 26, 2012 and failed to prove that he had satisfied the notice requirements of Idaho
Code §72-701. The Commission dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. The Commission also
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considered Claimant's "Request for Reconsideration," which contained no new facts or legal
arguments. The Commission noted that it examined the evidence in the case and reviewed the
record and determined that substantial competent evidence supports the decision as it stands. (R,

p. 49).
II.

A.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether the Commission Had Substantial and Competent Evidence to
Conclude that Claimant Failed to Prove that He Suffered an Injury from a
Work Place Accident.

B. Whether the Commission Had Substantial and Competent Evidence to
Conclude that Claimant Failed to Prove that He Satisfied the Notice
Requirements of Idaho Code §72-701.

C. Whether Defendants are Entitled to Attorneys' Fees on Appeal Pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 as the Appeal is Not Well-Grounded in Fact or
Warranted by Existing Law.

III.
A.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

In reviewing decisions by the Industrial Commission, "this Court exercises free review
over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's factual
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Knowlton v. Wood River

Medical Center, 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d 36, 41 (2011) (citing Idaho Code § 72-732).
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584-85, 270 P.3d 554,
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556-57 (2012) (quoting Uhl v. Ballard Med Prod., Inc., 138 Idaho 653,657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269
(2003). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance."
Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Company, 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). The Court

does not reweigh the evidence, and "[t]he Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility
and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous." Knowlton, 151
Idaho at 140, 254 P.3d at 41. All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to
the party who prevailed before the Commission. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 975 P.2d at 1180.
As the Court has noted, "We will not re-weigh the evidence or consider whether we would have
drawn a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Watson v. Joslin Mil/work, Inc., 149
Idaho 850, 854, 243 P.3d 666, 670 (2010).

B.

Worker's Compensation Law

"The terms of the Idaho Worker's Compensation statute are liberally construed in favor
of the employee. However, conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the
worker." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 755, 302 P.3d 718, 723 (2013).
The Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker when evidence
is conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992). The
Worker's Compensation Act places an emphasis on the element of causation in determining
whether a worker is entitled to compensation. In order to obtain worker's compensation benefits
a worker must prove that his disability results from an injury, which was caused by an accident
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arising out of and in the course of employment. Green v. Columbia Foods, Inc., 104 Idaho 204,
650 P.2d 1072 (1983); Tipton v. Jansson, 91 Idaho 904,435 P.2d 244 (1967).
The Worker's Compensation Act defines the key elements of a claim. Idaho Code § 72102( 18)(b) defines "accident" as "an unexpected, undersigned and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs and which can be reasonably
located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury." Subsection c defines
"injury" and "personal injury" and states that they shall be construed to include only "injury
caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body." Idaho
Code§ 72-102(18)(c).
Hard work is not an accident. Perez v. J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho 435, 816 P.2d 992
(1991). An increase of pain over a period of weeks without a discernible causative event is not
an accident. Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477, 905 P.3d 628 (2004)
"A claimant bears the burden of proving that an injury-causing accident occurred by
proving that an unexpected, undesigned and unlooked for mishap or untoward event took place."
Langley v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732,

736 (1995). To prevail on a workers' compensation claim, the claimant bears the burden of
establishing an accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138
Idaho 309, 63 P.3d 435 (2003); McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 335, 17 P.3d 272, 279
(2000).

"A claimant has the burden of proving a probable, not merely a possible, causal

connection between the employment and the injury .... " Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145
Idaho 325, 332, 179 P.3d 288, 295 (2008). "An accident must cause an injury, and an injury
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must be caused by an accident. The terms are not synonymous, however." Konvalinka, 140
Idaho at 480, 95 P.3d at 631.
The factual background and the Claimant's testimony in this case are similar to those in
the recent case of Clark v. Shari's Management Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 314 P.3d 631 (2013), and
the case of Hazen v. General Store, 111 Idaho 972, 729 P.2d 1035 (1986). In the Court's words
in Clark:
In Hazen, this Court affirmed the Commission's denial of a
worker's compensation claim, finding that the claimant's disc
herniation was the result of the "aging process" and "not the result
of employment." Id. at 973, 729 P.2d at 1036. There, although
Hazen had discussed her injury with her employer, she did not
attribute it to an accident at work and did not file a Notice of Injury
with the Industrial Commission. Id. It was only after Hazen
underwent surgery that she first attributed her injury to a workrelated accident. Id. ...
Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we are struck by
the similarity of the facts in this case to those presented in Hazen.
As with the claimant in Hazen, Clark discussed her injury with her
employer but did not attribute the injury to a specific accident at
work until after discovering that she required surgery. Clark told
medical providers that she did not know what the cause of her pain
was, attributing it to a variety of reasons including nothing at all
("out of the blue"), "standing funny," her weight, working many
years as a waitress without taking care of her body, and work in
general. Although Clark indicated her injury might be workrelated, she never suggested that her injury was due to an accident
at work until she filed a worker's compensation claim after
discovering her need for surgery. As we did in Hazen, we find that
substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that the
Claimant's injury was not caused by an industrial accident.
Clark at 583,314 P.3d at 638.
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The Workers' Compensation law requires an employee who suffers an accident to give
certain notice to the employer. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 345, 109 P.3d 1084,
1087 (2005). This requirement serves the purpose of giving the employer a timely opportunity to
investigate the accident and surrounding circumstances in order to avoid paying an unjust claim.
Id.

"No proceedings under this law shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident shall
have been given to the employer as soon as practicable but no later than sixty (60) days after the
happening thereof .... " LC. §72-701. The plain language of Idaho Code§ 72-701 requires that a
claimant give an employer notice of the accident no later than 60 days after the happening
thereof.
Therefore, because of the plain and unambiguous wording of LC. §
72-701 and I.C. § 72-102(18)(b), we hold the claimant must give
notice of the accident within 60 days after it occurred and not
within 60 days after the Claimant became aware the accident
caused a personal injury.
Arel v. T&L Enterprises, Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 189 P.3d 1149 (2008).

C.

The Commission Did Not Err in Finding That No Accident Occurred in July
2012.

The Industrial Commission reviewed all of the factual background and medical evidence,
and concluded that there was no industrial accident on July 26, 2012. The Commission stated:
Contemporaneous medical records fail to reflect that Claimant
gave a history regarding this incident, and the incident itself does
not figure in the September 26, 2012 recorded statement taken by
Surety's investigator. We find that the evidence fails to establish
that such an event occurred. More so than with the alleged
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accident of May 26, 2012, Claimant's assertion that such an
accident occurred is not the product of his memory of an inciting
event, but is rather the result of his subsequent reconstruction of
his activities at or around the time his low-back condition
progressed to the point that he was no longer able to work.
(R, p. 24). This conclusion is supported by substantial and credible evidence.
Claimant cannot bear his burden of proving that there was any July 26 trencher accident.
Indeed, the medical records are to the contrary. Claimant went to Kuna Chiropractic Clinic for
his regular "maintenance" a few days after the alleged trencher incident. (R, Defs Exh, p. 9).
There is absolutely no mention of any new incident or accident or injury, even though the
trencher incident allegedly occurred only a few days prior.

Just as significantly, there is

absolutely no mention of any trencher incident or accident or specific injury in the records of the
Primary Health Medical Group immediately after July 26, 2012. To the contrary, for many visits
the notes denied any acute injury or any accident. Indeed, the August 6, 2012 note from Dr.
Weiss states: "does not recall recent injury or strain." (R, Defs Exh, p. 13). Dr. Weiss also noted
that Claimant had chronic back pain for many years and denied an acute injury. (Id.). Claimant
visited two separate chiropractors and said not a word about an accident or acute injury to them
either. (R, Defs Exh, pp. 10 & 44 ). When he returned to Primary Health Medical Group and
saw Mr. Soares on August 17, 2012, Claimant complained of "Old injury cumulative injury" and
denied an acute injury. (/d.). Even when Claimant went to Dr. Martinez to try to get the case
established as a workers' compensation case, he acknowledged "no falls or trauma, but feels that
repetitive lifting and bending activities while on the job is the cause of his back pain. He states
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that he was seen recently at urgent care and claimed that it was not a work-related condition, but
now he feels that it is indeed a work related condition." (Id. p. 19).
The reality of this situation is that, as the Claimant himself acknowledges, and as he
stated to the State Insurance Fund investigator, there was no specific accident but rather an
accumulation of problems from 25 or 30 years of heavy labor working for the Employer and
previous employers. "The injured worker must do more than show an onset of pain while at
work in order to sustain his or her burden of proving an event or mishap occurred." McGee, 135
Idaho at 335, 17 P.3d at 279 (quoting Perez v. J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho 435, 438, 816 P.2d
992, 995 (1991)).
Claimant may have been able to retroactively point to an onset of pain sometime in late
July or early August, but this is insufficient under the workers' compensation statute:
Although an accident may and usually does cause the onset of
pain, "an accident" under the workers' compensation law is not
simply the onset of pain.... To establish that a mishap or event
occurred, an injured worker must do more than show an onset of
pain while at work. . . . Workers' compensation is not meant or
intended to be life or health insurance; it is purely accident and
occupational disease insurance .... The elimination of the accident
requirement would transform workers' compensation into health
insurance. Any such change in the law is the province of the
legislature, not this Court or the Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission found that the hard work performed by
the claimant in March and August 1997 constituted an accident
that aggravated her pre-existing osteoarthritis. Hard work is not an
accident. . .. In this case, there is no evidence of an unexpected,
undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event other
than the onset of symptoms from claimant's pre-existing condition.
That is not sufficient to constitute an accident under the workers'
compensation law.
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Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 477,479, 95 P.3d 628,630 (2004). 1

D.

The Commission Did Not Err in Finding that the Claimant Had Not Proven
that Any Incident Produced an Injury.

A claimant has the burden of not only proving that an untoward mishap/event occurred,
but also must prove that the incident produced violence to the physical structure of his body.
Idaho Code§ 72-102(18). "The Claimant in a worker's compensation case carries the burden of
proving that the condition for which compensation is sought is causally related to an industrial
accident." Duncan v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 203, 998 P.2d 1114, 1116 (2000). The
Commission found that a May 2012 event might have occurred (despite the evidence to the
contrary), but concluded that even if a May incident occurred the Claimant had not met his
burden of demonstrating that this incident caused damage to the physical structure of his body:

1 The Commission found that an accident or event may have occurred in late May ("whether on May 26, May 29 or
some other date in late May, we cannot determine") (R at 24), based on Kuna Chiropractic and Dr. Rosenlund's
records. That conclusion, however, is not supported by the evidence.

Claimant admits both in his deposition and to the State Insurance Fund investigator that there was no
accident in May of 2012. Indeed, he admitted as much at the Hearing. While Kuna Chiropractic's note suggests the
Claimant's low back was injured when he "jumped" out of a truck at work, Claimant acknowledges that he never
said this to the chiropractor but instead said his back began to hurt (more than the usual aches and pains he always
experienced) as a result of being busy at work, walking with a tool belt and getting in and out of his truck. His
testimony was:
Q:
So, that's what you discussed about this May incident, which was
gradually started hurting because you started working hard.
A.

My opinion.

(Tr p. 70, II. 4-7).
He acknowledged that he went to the chiropractor for "maintenance" of his chronic low back pain. His
wife did not remember any accident in May of 2012.
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Importantly, Claimant himself has no conviction whatsoever that
this incident produced an injury. He did not describe a sudden
worsening of symptomatology following this incident, and
although Dr. Rosenlund appears to attribute some part of
Claimant's symptomatology to the event described, we do not
believe that this chart note, to the extent that it might be viewed as
the expression of an opinion on the issue of causation, rests upon
an adequate foundation. We conclude that Claimant has failed to
meet his burden of proving that the accident of May 26, 2012
caused damage to the physical structure of his body.
Even if it be assumed that the July 2012 incident occurred as
alleged by Claimant, we find, as well, that the evidence fails to
establish that this incident caused damage to the physical structure
of Claimant's body.
Dr. Manos opined in a chart note on July 30, 2013 that lifting a
trencher could have caused Claimant's L4-5 disc herniation. His
opinion states a possibility, but it is insufficient to establish, to a
reasonable medical probability, that lifting a trencher to attach it to
a truck hitch on July 26, 2012 caused this injury. Claimant has
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he suffered
workplace accidents resulting in injury.
(R pp. 24-25).

This conclusion is supported by the evidence discussed above. Claimant testified that he
did not have a May accident and never told the chiropractor he had any accident. Indeed, he did
not recall a May incident until after he started renewing medical records in August. He did not
tell his physician immediately after the alleged July incident that he even had had an accident in
May and instead stated he has had "chronic back pain for many years." (R Defs Exh, p.13).
Similarly, there is no proof of any accident in July or August. Certainly there is no proof
that any "condition" was caused by the alleged accident or that Claimant suffered an "injury" as
defined by the worker's compensation statute.
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E. The Commission Did Not Err in Finding Claimant Had Not Provided Notice
of Either Incident.

The Commission analyzed all of the written evidence and considered the testimony and
recorded statement of the Claimant and concluded that Claimant's claim failed for lack of proper
notice. This conclusion is not clear error but is supported by the record.
There is absolutely no evidence that Claimant informed the Employer or Surety of any
claimed accident of May 2012. Again, Claimant's testimony at Hearing and in his deposition
and his statement to the State Insurance Fund investigator make clear that while at most he may
have informed Mr. Baker that his back was bothering him, he never informed anyone at the
Employer about a claimed accident. Indeed, he appeared to forget there was any "accident" in
May when making a claim for an alleged July accident until after he had received copies of past
medical records and noticed that his chiropractor had put down on the chart note an entry
regarding "jumped out of truck at work."

It was only after reviewing this document that

Claimant even suggested any type of belief that he had suffered an accident in May. Obviously
he could not have given notice when he did not even think there was an accident.
Claimant's testimony at hearing is also instructive. The Referee asked him about the
alleged May incident:
Q. Okay. Well what happened? What happened to create your
condition?
A

The original incident, I believe, was stepping, jumping out of
my work van or our work trailer that hauls our scissor lift to
jobs. The exact date is unclear of what day it happened,
because of the dates that were written down of May 26th and
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May 29 th • That May 26 th actually falls on a Saturday and I
don't have any evidence saying that I actually worked on that
Saturday or if - when I worked, what location it was, and only
through the doctor's notes to - let's see, May, June, July,
August, September - four months later that I learned what I
had said to a doctor when the medical evidence was requested
by the defendant, State Insurance Fund.
Q.

So, do you remember what you said to the doctor?

A.

Only after reading his statement. I don't - I told him I don't
know exactly how I got hurt at work. I told him I didn't fall
off a trailer and break my leg, because it wasn't that kind of
event. It was - you know, they say industrial accident, I say I
hurt myself. I wouldn't go to Brad and say I had an accident
today, my back hurts, or I'm sore today. I wouldn't have done
that.

(Tr. p. 21, 11. 5-25, p. 22, 1. 1).
Mr. Baker's testimony at hearing was quite clear and consistent that the Employer was
not informed of any claimed May accident until September or October of 2012, months after the
May "accident" allegedly occurred. Claimant's testimony at hearing was much less consistent
and much less credible. His other statements are replete with comments that he admitted that he
did not tell the Employer of any particular incident or accident in late May of 2012. This is
reinforced by the fact that the Claimant paid for the chiropractic "maintenance" on his own and
never requested the Employer to pay or submitted any type of notice or demand for
reimbursement from the workers' compensation system until at least late September.
Claimant also failed to give notice of any "trencher incident" for more than sixty days.
While Claimant did notify the Employer that his low back was hurting in August and that he
traced it to continuing strenuous activity at his employment, he never gave written notice of any

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -24
00524438.000

alleged incident involving a trencher until months later and only after he was asked repeatedly by
the State Insurance Fund about how his injury occurred. The medical records and the recorded
interview of Claimant show that only after mid-October 2012, more than sixty days after the
alleged July accident, did the Claimant even mention orally a trencher incident.

Indeed,

Claimant testified at hearing that "as I stated before I didn't know exactly when, where, and how
[the alleged accident] happened when I spoke to many doctors .... " (Tr. p. 34, 11. 18-21; see

also p. 35, 11. 8-17).

This delay prejudiced the Defendants in investigating the claim and

directing medical treatment.
The Commission found that Claimant first provided Defendants written notice of his
alleged July 26, 2012 industrial accident in an email dated November 6, 2012, 103 days after the
alleged industrial accident.

(R p. 26).

It found that he had never previously notified his

Employer, Brad Baker, of a specific accident. It found that Claimant had never provided notice
of any alleged May 29, 2012 at least until August 2012 after he had reviewed the past medical
records. (Id.) This is supported by the fact that Claimant himself did not believe he had a
"accident" in May 2012 and acknowledged that the first time he even concluded that he had
suffered an "accident" was after reviewing his medical records in August or September to try to
make a claim.
The Commission then went on to consider the issue of prejudice. Under Idaho Code §72104, a claimant must establish that his failure to give proper statutory notice has not prejudiced
the employer. Claimant must affirmatively prove that the employer was not prejudiced by the
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lack of timely notice. Jackson v. JST Manufacturing, 142 Idaho 836, 136 P.3d 307 (2006). The
Claimant did not even attempt to meet his burden.
To the contrary, Claimant's failure to provide timely notice hampered Defendants' ability
to investigate the validity of the claim(s) and hampered their ability to provide reasonable
medical treatment if there had been an industrial accident. The Commission's conclusion that
Claimant had failed to meet his burden of proving that Defendants were not prejudiced by his
delays in reporting his claimed industrial accidents is supported by the record.

F. The McKim Report.
Claimant claims that the Commission misread evidence by misreading the "new patient
history" form from his visit with chiropractor McKim on August 13, 2012. The Claimant claims
that his writing should have been read to say that his pain started "a week ago" rather than four
weeks ago.

Even if the Commission misread the handwriting, this is immaterial since the

evidence is still that the Claimant's sciatica came on "gradually" without an accident. (R, Defs
Exh p. 12). Moreover, this reading requested by Claimant supports the Commission's findings
because "one week" before August 13 is long after the alleged July 26 trencher accident. The
McKim records reemphasize the point that the Claimant reported that his recurring sciatica had
restarted gradually without the recurrence of any incident on July 26 or any other date.
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G. The Commission Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Not Setting a Hearing
Before the Full Commission or in Any Discovery Matters.

Although Claimant's argument is unclear, it appears he is contending that the Industrial
Commission was obligated to schedule a hearing before the full Commission because the
Claimant so requested.

While the Industrial Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and

Procedure allow for the full Commission to hear a claim, this is a matter of discretion for the
Commission. This Court "will not supplant the views" of the Commission with its own pursuant
to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Warren v. Williams & Parsons, PC, CPAs, _ __
Idaho _ _ _ , 337 P.3d 1257, 1266 (2014). Moreover, the Claimant did not raise this issue
with the Commission other than in his Response to Defendants' Request for Calendaring and the
issue was therefore waived.

In any event, the full Commission did not simply accept the

Recommendation of the Referee but instead reviewed all of the evidence and made the decision
itself.
The Claimant has also raised a claim that the Commission erred in failing to order
Defendants to provide requested discovery. There is absolutely no proof that Defendants failed
to provide appropriate discovery responses. There is also no proof that Claimant brought any
motion before the Commission regarding that issue. Accordingly, this issue was also waived.
More importantly, evidentiary issues are governed under an abuse of discretion standard,
Warren, supra, 337 P.3d at 1264, and there is no suggestion that the Commission abused its

discretion in any discovery matters.
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H. Defendants are Entitled to an Award of Fees Under Idaho Appellate Rule
11.2.

Claimant is simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the
Commission. While the Claimant is acting pro se and has been given extraordinary latitude by
the Referee and the Industrial Commission and this Court, he is still bound by the rules. Rule
11.2, IAR, provides that a party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign each brief and
that such signature constitutes a certificate that he believes "after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
This Claimant brought his Complaint and had his day "in court" at the Hearing in which
he was granted great latitude to present his evidence and testimony.

The full Industrial

Commission considered his claim and after reviewing all of the evidence and testimony
determined that there was not a valid claim. The Claimant submitted a document which was not
a proper Notice of Appeal but nevertheless the Commission considered it as a Request for
Reconsideration, reviewed the Request and once again denied that motion as Claimant had not
provided any new information but simply wanted a redetermination of the facts. Similarly, this
appeal is simply a request that the Supreme Court re-review the facts and come to a different
conclusion. His brief is deficient procedurally and substantively. The Claimant simply wishes
the Supreme Court to rehash the evidence and perhaps come to a different conclusion because he
did not prevail. His multiple pleadings and appeal have cost the Defendants needless increase in
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the cost of litigation and Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees. See Sims v.

Jacobsen, _ _ Idaho _ _ , 342 P.2d 907 (2015).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Claimant's contention appears to be that his years of hard work as an electrician caused
his back pain. He appears to contend that, looking backward, his July-August onset of pain came
during a time when he was picking up and/or using a trencher and therefore he must have hurt
his back while lifting or using that trencher, even though he did not know it at the time and even
denied any such incident to his medical providers. Claimant appears to argue that notice to the
Employer was satisfied because the Employer knew he was having back pain at various times
during his employment.
Unfortunately, those contentions are not supported by evidence or the Idaho Workers'
Compensation statute. Claimant did not have an accident and never even reported an incident to
his Employer until after he recognized that he needed significant medical treatment and that he
would have to identify some incident in order to qualify for workers' compensation medical
benefits.
Defendants submit that Claimant did not have an accident in late May of 2012 and did
not even suggest to the Employer that he had any type of an accident for long past 60 days.
Defendants submit that Claimant did not have a "trencher" accident in late July 2012 and only
came up with that explanation months later. He did not report either to the Employer or the
medical providers that he had any accident in late July 2012. He did not present evidence that
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his continuing chronic back pain was caused by any accident. Moreover, he did not give notice
of any "accident" for more than 60 days and Defendants have been prejudiced by the delay.
Defendants proved below that Claimant did not have any accident and that he did not
provide timely notice. Claimant did not bear his burden at the hearing of proving that he was
entitled to Title 72 benefits. But the issue before this Court is not whether Defendants proved
their case, nor even whether this Court would have decided the claim below differently. The sole
issue is whether the Industrial Commission's conclusions are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party - the Defendants.
There appears to be no real issue that the Commission had more than substantial and competent
evidence to support its findings. "The Commission's findings are binding on this Court when
supported by substantial competent evidence." Shubert v. Macy's West, Inc., _ _ _ Idaho
_ _ , __ P.3d _ _ , 2015 WL8369634 (February 27, 2015).
Defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the decision of the Industrial
Commission dismissing Claimant's Complaint with prejudice and award Defendants attorney
fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2.

DATED t h i s ~ day of March, 2015.
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

By: ____,,__._.,.,,,___ __.___ _ _ _ _ __
Neil D. Mcfeeley, of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lltt, day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
)

Scott Chadwick
5486 Deer Flat Road
Nampa, Idaho 83686

[ v(U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax

Neil D. Mcfeeley
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